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Abstract
This article studies several variants of the location-routing problem using a coopera-
tive game-theoretic framework. The authors derive characteristics in terms of subaddi-
tivity, convexity, and non-emptiness of the core. Moreover, for some of the game variants,
it is shown that for facility opening costs substantially larger than the costs associated
with routing, the core is always non-empty. The theoretical results are supported by nu-
merical experiments aimed at illustrating the properties and deriving insights. Among
others, it is observed that, while in general it is not possible to guarantee core allocations,
in a huge majority of cases the core is non-empty.
Keywords: Collaborative logistics; Location-routing; Cooperative game theory; Cost
allocation
1 Introduction
Recent literature surveys by Guajardo and Rönnqvist (2016), Gansterer and Hartl (2018),
and Cleophas et al. (2018) reveal a considerable growth in the number of articles and applica-
tions of collaborative transportation. This literature positions collaborative transportation
as an important mechanism to reduce cost and negative environmental effects, and to in-
crease profits and service levels. In parallel, the literature on location-routing problems has
also grown considerably. The central problem in this literature is to locate facilities while
simultaneously finding routes to serve customers from these facilities. It has early been
recognized that tackling these decision problems separately may lead to suboptimal solu-
tions (Perl, 1987; Salhi and Rand, 1989). Reviews by Prodhon and Prins (2014), Drexl and
Schneider (2015), and Schneider and Drexl (2017) give account of a broad range of applica-
tions as well as a considerable progress in solution methods for location-routing problems.
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Recent emergence of dynamic on-demand warehousing (Sinha, 2016) emphasizes the poten-
tial in applicability even further as it introduces facility location decisions of an operational
(short-term) nature.
Cleophas et al. (2018) list the cooperative planning within location-routing problems
as one of future challenges in operations research. Despite the growing interest in both
collaborative transportation and location-routing, the integration of these two areas remains
fairly unattended by researchers. The only exceptions, to our knowledge, are van Oost
(2016), Quintero-Araujo et al. (2017), and Ouhader and Kyal (2017), which present promising
studies on the benefits of collaboration in location-routing. Besides the academic interest,
the intersection of these two areas motivates from practical situations, such as the installation
of urban consolidation centres for city logistics and the formation of strategic alliances. For
example, Paddeu (2017) recounts the case of the Bristol-Bath freight consolidation centre
from the perspective of its users and points to pricing and cost coverage as important factors
for success or failure. If a consolidation centre is located in the periphery of a city to serve
users in the city centre by shared routes, the users will naturally be concerned about the
cost of the service and how this compares to the non-shared solution. The location of the
centre may, therefore, play an important role in the willingness of users to adopt the shared
solution. Another example in practice is given by the alliance between Colgate-Palmolive,
GlaxoSmithKline, Henkel, and Sara Lee in France (Eyers, 2010). The alliance started in
2005 with cooperation on routing only, but subsequently led to a decrease in the number
of facilities of the alliance from four to only one. With these sharing practices emerging as
important mechanisms to improve operations, it turns important for firms to understand the
economic foundations for cooperation in location-routing.
In this article, we study several variants of the location-routing problem using a co-
operative game-theoretic framework. By defining a transferable utility game for each of
these variants, we are able to derive essential properties that characterize the behaviour of
cooperation in location-routing from a cost sharing perspective. In particular, this frame-
work is useful to answer whether incentives exist for all firms to align under a collaborative
location-routing approach.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly overview related
literature. Section 3 describes the main variants of the location-routing problem and de-
fines the corresponding cooperative games. In Section 4, we derive theoretical results for
these games. Section 5 summarizes numerical results obtained from experiments. Section 6
presents our concluding remarks.
2 Literature review
Horizontal cooperation in transportation and logistics has been recognized as an important
instrument to reduce costs, increase productivity, improve customer service, stabilize or im-
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prove the market position, among other benefits (Cruijssen et al., 2007a,b). Recent literature
surveys by Guajardo and Rönnqvist (2016) and Gansterer and Hartl (2018) reveal a consid-
erable growth in the number of articles and applications of collaborative transportation.
The vehicle routing problem tackles a question of how to perform tours to visit a group of
customers from one or more facilities using one or more vehicles. For a current state of this
literature, see for example Adewumi and Adeleke (2018). In the vehicle routing problems,
the horizontal cooperation can be found on several different levels in form of cooperation
of customers, carriers or shippers. For the customer level, the traveling salesman game and
the basic vehicle routing game are among the most studied. For their definitions, see for
example studies by Potters et al. (1992) and Göthe-Lundgren et al. (1996). These problems
focus on allocating costs of realized tours among the visited customers. When it comes to
the shippers and carriers, the collaborative vehicle routing problem has been introduced.
In the collaborative vehicle routing problem, the cooperating shippers and carriers pool
their customers and allow for visiting customers of different shippers within the same tour.
Gansterer and Hartl (2018) present a survey on this literature and acknowledge a usual
lack of distinction between a cooperation of shippers and a cooperation of carriers. They
suggest that it might be sometimes important to recognize a difference in the information
they possess. However, since the focus of this article is on centralized collaborative planning,
we assume that the shippers and carriers possess the same information and make decisions
jointly. Thus, their distinction is not needed and we refer to them simply as shippers.
For situations where the shippers already know where their potential customers would
be, but they do not have a facility from which to serve them, the facility location problem
becomes useful. The facility location problem aims to find the optimal location of facilities
such that each customer gets assigned to a facility. The optimality lies in minimizing the sum
of facility opening costs and connection costs. Computation of the connection costs differs
among various formulations of the facility location problem. For an overview of several
variants of the problem, see Laporte et al. (2015). Goemans and Skutella (2004) introduced
the cooperative facility location game to deal with a cooperative formulation of the problem
in which several shippers aim to get their customers assigned to a facility. By allowing the
customers to be connected to facilities of different shippers, this problem might allow for
substantial savings.
Perl (1987) and Salhi and Rand (1989) pointed out that tackling the decisions on facility
location and vehicle routing separately may lead to suboptimal solutions. With the aim
to connect these problems, the location-routing problem was addressed by a large stream
of literature since then, as documented in surveys by Nagy and Salhi (2007), Prodhon and
Prins (2014), Drexl and Schneider (2015), and Schneider and Drexl (2017). Among others,
these surveys discuss different variants of the location-routing problem such as, for exam-
ple, the standard location-routing problem (LRP), the capacitated location-routing problem
(LRP-C), and the location-routing problem with a limited number of facilities (LRP-L). The
3
LRP is used in numerous applications as documented, for example, by Watson-Gandy and
Dohrn (1973), Or and Pierskalla (1979), Bruns et al. (2000), and Ambrosino et al. (2009)
for the cases of food and drink distribution, blood bank location, parcel delivery, and food
distribution, respectively. As claimed by Prodhon and Prins (2014), the LRP-C is nowa-
days addressed to a larger extent than the LRP. For example, Nambiar et al. (1981, 1989),
Gunnarsson et al. (2006), and Marinakis and Marinaki (2008) utilize the LRP-C in rubber
plant location, shipping industry, and wood distribution, respectively. The LRP-L arises
when some types of facilities cause nuisance and social rejection. A city taking this into
account could decide to impose a limit on the number of a certain type of facilities. For
instance, Caballero et al. (2007) deal with one such problem by using the LRP-L for location
of incineration plants for disposal of solid animal waste.
While a large number of articles in this literature stream have been devoted to develop-
ment of solution methods, very few have studied collaboration in location-routing. Among
the exceptions, Quintero-Araujo et al. (2017) use numerical experiments to compare the non-
cooperative and cooperative scenarios in the location-routing problem in terms of the total
cost and the total traveling-related CO2 emissions. For the location-routing problem variant
with two-echelons, Ouhader and Kyal (2017) analyze the cooperation based on three different
objectives, minimizing the total cost, minimizing the total amount of traveling-related CO2
emissions, and maximizing the number of created job opportunities (social impact). Through
numerical experiments, they observe how each objective separately affects the other mea-
sures. In literature on collaborative transportation problems, cooperative game theory is
commonly used to derive theoretical properties and investigate implications of the collabora-
tion. To our knowledge, our article is the first one studying cooperation in location-routing
problems from a cooperative game-theoretic perspective.
3 Location-routing problems and game definitions
In this section, we briefly present some of the main location-routing problem variants and
then formally introduce the definition of transferable utility games for these variants.
3.1 Location-routing problem variants
3.1.1 Standard location-routing problem
Our departing point is the standard location-routing problem (LRP). Its definition, as de-
scribed for example by Prodhon and Prins (2014), assumes a set of potential facility locations
and a set of customers (and their corresponding demands) to be given. The LRP then aims
at finding locations and routes that minimize the total routing costs, costs of using vehicles
and costs of opening facilities while assuring that all customers are visited and their demand
is satisfied.
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Let G be the set of feasible sites of candidate facilities, I the set of customers to be served
and V = G ∪ I the set of all such nodes. Let K be a set of all vehicles available for routing
from the facilities (no facility has a specific fleet). Let cij be the cost of traveling from node
i ∈ V to node j ∈ V , a the cost of acquiring a vehicle, and fg the cost of establishing and
operating a facility at site g ∈ G. The number of units demanded by customer i ∈ I is di.
The capacity of one vehicle is q. To make the values comparable, they need to be normalized
with respect to a certain time period. This depends on a particular application in question.
Sometimes, for example, an annual average may serve the purpose.
The LRP can be formulated as an integer linear programming model. Let Xijk be a
binary decision variable which takes value 1 if vehicle k travels directly from node i to node
j, and zero otherwise (k ∈ K, i ∈ V , j ∈ V , such that i 6= j and at least one of these two











































Xijk ≤ |S| − 1 ∀S ⊆ I : S 6= ∅, ∀k ∈ K, (6)∑
j∈I
Xgjk − Zg ≤ 0 ∀k ∈ K, ∀g ∈ G, (7)
Xijk ∈ {0, 1} ∀k ∈ K, ∀i, j ∈ V : i 6= j, {i, j} ∩ I 6= ∅, (8)
Zg ∈ {0, 1} ∀g ∈ G. (9)
Objective function (1) minimizes the sum of routing costs, the costs of using vehicles and the
costs of operating facilities. Constraints (2) state that each customer must be served by one
vehicle. Constraints (3) state that the capacity of vehicles must be respected. Constraints
(4) are flow conservation constraints. Constraints (5) express that no vehicle can depart from
more than one facility. Constraints (4) and (5) impose that every used vehicle has to come
back to the same facility it departed from. Constraints (6) eliminate sub-tours. Constraints
(7) ensure that a facility can be used if and only if this facility is open. Constraints (8) and
(9) state the binary nature of the variables.
Note that in this formulation, constraints (2) and (3) imply that each customer needs to
be served by a single vehicle. In combination with constraints (7) this also means that the
whole demand of a customer needs to be satisfied from only one facility. Consequently, the
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problem might become infeasible if there is not enough vehicles to satisfy the total demand
or if a customer demands more than the capacity of the vehicles.
3.1.2 Capacitated location-routing problem
The capacitated location-routing problem (LRP-C) introduces an upper bound in the sup-
ply available at the facilities. The limited capacity of the facilities leads to the following
modifications of the model (1)–(9).
Parameter wg is added and defined as the capacity of facility g ∈ G. New binary decision
variable Fig takes value 1 if customer i is assigned to facility g, and 0 otherwise (i ∈ I,





Xuik ≤ 1 + Fig ∀g ∈ G, ∀i ∈ I, ∀k ∈ K (10)
need to hold. To make constraints (7) account for the limited capacity of the candidate
facilities, they are replaced by ∑
i∈I
diFig ≤ wgZg ∀g ∈ G. (11)
Constraints (10) state that each customer served by a vehicle departing from a certain
facility must be assigned to this facility. The term
∑
u∈V Xguk is equal to 1 if the vehicle k
departs from the facility g while
∑
u∈V Xuik is equal to 1 if this vehicle supplies customer
i. If both terms are equal to 1, it implies Fig to equal 1. Constraints (11) ensure that
the capacities of the facilities must be respected. At the same time, constraints (11) forbid
customers to be assigned to a facility which is not open.
To avoid infeasibility of the LRP-C, there need to be enough facility candidates with
large enough capacities such that each customer can be assigned to and fully supplied by
only one facility. Besides, as for the LRP, there need to be enough vehicles to satisfy the
total demand and customers cannot demand more than the capacity of the vehicles.
3.1.3 Location-routing problem with a limited number of facilities
The location-routing problem with a limited number of facilities (LRP-L) introduces an
upper bound in the maximum number of facilities that can be opened. If a condition that
only l facilities can be used takes place, the model (1)-(9) needs to be modified by introducing
the parameter l and adding the constraint∑
g∈G
Zg ≤ l (12)
which ensures that the total number of opened facilities is less or equal to the limit l.
The feasibility of the LRP-L is subject to the same conditions as in the case of the LRP,
that is, there need to be enough vehicles to satisfy the total demand and customers cannot
demand more than the capacity of the vehicles.
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3.2 Location-routing games
Our interest lies in a collaborative version of the location-routing problem. When shippers
collaborate, the overall problem opens opportunities to combine their customers within the
same tours and serve their demands from shared facilities. To model this situation, we use
a cooperative game-theoretic framework.
3.2.1 Standard location-routing game
The standard location-routing game (LRG) is defined as a transferable utility game by the
tuple (N,C) where N = {1, . . . , n} denotes the set of all players (shippers), S the set of
all subsets of N , and C : S → R the characteristic function. The characteristic function C
assigns to each coalition S ∈ S its optimal cost, that is, the optimal objective value of the
corresponding LRP (by convention, C(∅) = 0). Let In be the set of customers originally to
be served by a shipper n ∈ N . The corresponding LRP for computing C(S) is then the LRP
in which the set of customers to be served is I =
⋃
n∈S In.
3.2.2 Location-routing game extensions
Similarly, for the two other variants of the location-routing problem, the LRP-C and the
LRP-L, we define the capacitated location-routing game (LRG-C1) and the location-routing
game with a limited number of facilities (LRG-L1), respectively. The LRG-C1 introduces a
problem where each coalition solves a location-routing problem with capacitated facilities.
The LRG-L1 extends the standard location-routing game by assuming a limit on the number
of facilities that can be located by each coalition. These capacities and limits are independent
of the coalitions’ size or members and remain constant.
Unlike in other collaborative transportation problems (such as the collaborative vehicle
routing problem or the facility location game), in both the LRG-C1 and the LRG-L1, when
cooperation takes place, the original strategies before such cooperation are not necessarily
feasible. When two shippers use the same facility and operate on its full capacity in their
stand-alone strategies, this strategy is not possible once they cooperate. The same problem
occurs for the LRG-L1 if the shippers already use the maximum allowed number of facilities
in their stand-alone strategies. Therefore, we also formulate alternative models for the
capacitated location-routing game and the location-routing game with a limited number of
facilities as LRG-C2 and LRG-L2, respectively.
Let the LRG-C2 be defined as a transferable utility game in a similar way as the LRG-C1,
that is, for computation of each characteristic function value, the LRP-C is solved. Now,
however, these LRP-C’s differ not only in the sets of customers I =
⋃
n∈S In, but also in the
capacities wg =
∑
n∈S wgn where wgn denotes a partial capacity available at site g ∈ G if
shipper n ∈ N is in the coalition.
Similarly, let the LRG-L2 be defined as a transferable utility game in which the LRP-L
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is solved for each characteristic function value computation. As opposed to the LRG-L1,
however, these LRP-L’s differ not only in the sets of customers I =
⋃
n∈S In, but also in
the limits on the number of facilities being computed as l =
∑
n∈S ln where ln stands for a
partial limit on the number of facilities.
As opposed to the LRG-C1 and the LRG-L1, in the LRG-C2 and the LRG-L2, the
capacities and limits are dependent on the coalitions’ size and members. The shippers are
associated with partial capacities or limits which may be utilized in any coalition by adding
up the partial capacities or limits of all its members.
All the formulations have their place in practice. The LRG-C1 can be used, for example,
if shippers may for some reason be associated only with facilities up to a certain capacity per
location. For situations where several facilities can be opened at each location, the LRG-C1 is
an appropriate model too. This reflects a case in which facilities consist of blocks of a certain
capacity and each shipper or coalition of shippers determines how many blocks to open. On
the other hand, in a single-commodity situation, if shippers for example have a maximum
supply available for each candidate facility, its value stands for the partial capacity of this
facility in the LRG-C2 formulation. If the facilities cause social rejection and shippers do
not want to be associated with more than a certain number of them, cooperation might not
increase the number and the LRG-L1 becomes the appropriate model. If, on the other hand,
there is an enforcement preventing a shipper from operating more than a certain number of
facilities, cooperation might allow the total limit to be a sum of the limits of all involved
shippers. Such situation requires the use of the LRG-L2.
4 Theoretical results
Cooperation does not necessarily guarantee beneficial outcomes for all parties. To assess
such issues, properties of subadditivity and convexity of a cooperative game come in useful.
Cooperative game (N,C) is considered subadditive if its characteristic function is subad-
ditive, i.e.,
C(S ∪ T ) ≤ C(S) + C(T ) ∀S, T ⊆ N : S ∩ T = ∅. (13)
If the subadditivity holds, no coalition is less profitable than some of its partitions. That is,
there is no loss involved in merging coalitions with respect to the total costs incurred.
The convexity of a cooperative game is a stronger property which requires submodularity
of its characteristic function, i.e.,
C(S ∪ T ) + C(S ∩ T ) ≤ C(S) + C(T ) ∀S, T ⊆ N, (14)
or equivalently (Schrijver, 2003),
C(S ∪ {i})− C(S) ≥ C(T ∪ {i})− C(T ) ∀i ∈ N, ∀S, T ⊆ N : S ⊆ T ⊆ N \ {i}. (15)
Studies of transferable utility games naturally lead to studies of cost allocations which
prescribe the costs to be paid by particular players within the cooperation. For a cooperative
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game of n players, the cost allocation is a vector (π1, . . . , πn) ∈ Rn. Conditions of efficiency,∑
j∈N
πj = C(N), (16)
and rationality, ∑
j∈S
πj ≤ C(S) ∀S ⊆ N, (17)
define a set of cost allocations known as the core as first introduced by Shapley (1955). A
vector in the core proposes a redistribution of total costs of the grand coalition N and is
said to be stable, as there are no incentives for any subset of players to deviate from the
collaboration. In the literature, this has been recognized as an essential condition to sustain
the cooperation in practice. It is hence desirable for a cooperative game to have a non-empty
core and it turns interesting to study whether a game admits or not allocations in the core.
4.1 Game-theoretic properties of the standard location-routing game
Theorem 1. The standard location-routing game is subadditive.
Proof. For the LRG, it is easy to see that for any disjoint sets S and T , the solution of a
LRP where customers of shippers in S and T are served using the same facilities, routes and
vehicles as in the separate problems for S and T is a feasible solution of the LRP for set
S∪T . The value of C(S) +C(T ) is therefore an upper bound on the optimal objective value
C(S ∪ T ) of the problem for S ∪ T and the LRG is hence subadditive.
Theorem 2. The core of the standard location-routing game can be empty.
Proof. Göthe-Lundgren et al. (1996) present an example to prove that the core of the basic
vehicle routing game can be empty. By adapting this example, we can prove that the core
of the LRG can be empty as well. Figure 1 illustrates the location of three customers (1,
2 and 3) and feasible sites of candidate facilities (A, B and C). Each customer is a client
of a different shipper which can hence be referred to by 1, 2 and 3 as well. The figure also
contains the transportation costs. The costs of establishing and operating a facility are equal
to one unit for each of the sites. The demand of each customer is of one unit. The capacity
of each vehicle is of two units. The cost of using a vehicle is set to zero. Calculating the
characteristic cost function for the singletons, we obtain C({1}) = C({2}) = C({3}) = 3.
The routing cost is equal to 2 and the facility opening cost to 1. The facility opened is one
of the two adjacent to the customer. For the two-player coalitions, C({1, 2}) = C({1, 3}) =
C({2, 3}) = 4.7 (routing cost of 3.7 and facility opening cost of 1). For the three-player
coalition, C({1, 2, 3}) = 7.7 (routing cost of 5.7 and facility opening cost of 2). From the
costs, we can notice there is an incentive for a two-player coalition. It is clearly more
beneficial than a non-cooperative state. In case of the three-player coalition, whichever the
cost allocation is, there will always be two shippers that could get better off by excluding













Figure 1: A standard collaborative location-routing problem with an empty core (the circles
and diamonds represent customers and candidate facilities, respectively, and the arcs indicate
the traveling costs)
Corollary 3. The standard location-routing game is not necessarily convex.
Proof. According to Shapley (1971), the core of a convex game is not empty. Equivalently,
by contraposition, if the core of a game is empty, the game must be non-convex. Since the
core of the LRG can be empty, it follows that this game cannot be convex in general.
Moreover, in the problem of Figure 1, taking coalitions S = {1}, T = {1, 2} and i = 3,
the left-hand side of inequality (15) is 4.7−3 = 1.7 while the right-hand side is 7.7−4.7 = 3,
thus the inequality is violated and this is an example of a non-convex game.
4.2 Game-theoretic properties of the location-routing game extensions
Theorem 4. The LRG-C1 is not necessarily subadditive or convex.
Proof. A counter-example is illustrated in Figure 2. Again, we consider each customer being










Figure 2: A non-subadditive capacitated location-routing game (the circles and diamonds
represent customers and candidate facilities, respectively, and the arcs indicate the traveling
costs)
to one unit for site A and six units for site B. Both candidate facilities have a maximum
capacity equal to one unit. The demand for each customer is of one unit. The capacity of
each vehicle is of two units. The cost of using a vehicle is set to zero. For coalition S = {1, 2},
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facility A is opened and C(S) = 4. For coalition T = {3, 4}, facility A is opened as well and
C(T ) = 8. However, for S ∪ T , both facilities are opened and C(S ∪ T ) = 13 which causes
that C(S∪T )  C(S)+C(T ) and the subadditivity (as well as convexity) does not hold.
Theorem 5. The LRG-L1 is not necessarily subadditive or convex.
Proof. Considering the same example (Figure 2) for the location-routing game with a limited
number of facilities, but now with omitting the maximum capacities, introducing a limit of
l = 1 on the number of facilities and having the costs of establishing and operating facilities
equal to 1 for both A and B, leads to C(S) = 4, C(T ) = 4 and C(S ∪T ) = 11. Hence, again
C(S ∪ T )  C(S) + C(T ) and the subadditivity and convexity properties do not hold.
Theorem 6. The core of the LRG-C1 and the LRG-L1 can be empty.
Proof. Clearly, if each facility offered a maximum capacity that could accommodate all
customers in the game, the LRG-C1 would reduce to the LRG. Similarly, if the limit on the
number of facilities l was equal or higher than the number of all potential facility sites, the
LRG-L1 would reduce to the LRG. Therefore, the example in Figure 1 could be used to show
a possibility of an empty core in the LRG-C1 and the LRG-L1 as well as for the case of the
LRG.
Theorem 7. The LRG-C2 and the LRG-L2 are subadditive.
Proof. For both the LRG-C2 and the LRG-L2, it is easy to see that for any disjoint sets
S and T , the solution where customers of shippers in S and T are served using the same
facilities, routes and vehicles as for the separate problems for S and T is a feasible solution
for set S∪T . The value of C(S)+C(T ) is therefore an upper bound on the optimal objective
value C(S ∪ T ) and subadditivity is hence satisfied.
Theorem 8. The core of the LRG-C2 and the LRG-L2 can be empty.
Proof. For illustration of the possibility of an empty core, the same reasoning as in the case
of the LRG-C1 and the LRG-L1 could be used. That is, large enough capacities and large
enough limits on the number of facilities would reduce the LRG-C2 and the LRG-L2 to the
LRG which, as shown in the example of Figure 1, can have an empty core.
Corollary 9. The LRG-C2 and the LRG-L2 are not necessarily convex.
Proof. As in the proof of Corollary 3, the posible emptiness of the core consequently leads
to non-convexity.
All the aforementioned results are summarized in Table 1 along with the property satis-
faction of some of the collaborative transportation problems outlined in Section 2, namely
the collaborative vehicle routing problem (CoopVRP) and the facility location game (FLG).
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In both the CoopVRP and the FLG, as defined for example by Zibaei et al. (2016) and Goe-
mans and Skutella (2004), respectively, it is easy to see that the subadditivity is generally
satisfied. Clearly, when the facilities’ capacities are unconstrained, a combination of any
non-cooperative solutions forms a feasible solution in the cooperative formulation. On the
other hand, Goemans and Skutella (2004) show for the case of the FLG that the convexity
is not generally satisfied and the core can be empty. For the case of the CoopVRP, the trav-
eling salesman game can be reformulated as a special case of the CoopVRP with vehicles of
a large capacity and shippers each serving one customer and possessing one facility located
in the same position for all shippers. Then, Potters et al. (1992) show that the convexity
is not generally satisfied and the core can be empty. In Table 1, checkmarks show that
the respective property holds for any instance of the problem. If a checkmark is missing,
this property might be satisfied for particular instances, but does not hold in general. The
Table 1: Properties of different variants of the location-routing games, the collaborative
vehicle routing problem, the facility location game, and the transportation game
subadditive convex non-empty core
LRG X - -
LRG-C1 - - -
LRG-L1 - - -
LRG-C2 X - -
LRG-L2 X - -
CoopVRP X - -
FLG X - -
TG X - X
results might suggest that all collaborative transportation problems allow for an empty core.
To avoid such misinterpretation, without its definition, we also include the transportation
game (TG) introduced by Samet et al. (1984). It is an example of a game which is always
subadditive and has a non-empty core, but is not necessarily convex (Sánchez-Soriano et al.,
2001).
4.3 Impact of the facility costs
The facility opening costs, fg in the model (1)–(9), play an important role in the location-
routing games. They stand for all costs necessary to establish and operate a facility. In
what follows, we will show that, if the facility opening costs are substantially larger than
the traveling costs and the costs of using vehicles, the core of the LRG is guaranteed to be
non-empty.
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Theorem 10. For any traveling and vehicle-related costs, there exists K ∈ R such that, if
fg ≥ K for all g ∈ G, the core of the respective standard location-routing game is non-empty.
Proof. Solving the model (1)–(9) for the grand coalition N results in an optimal objective
value of C(N). This cost could be allocated to the shippers for example such that each of




∀j ∈ N. (18)
This allocation clearly satisfies the efficiency condition (16).
It would be feasible to open only the least costly facility and serve all customers from
this facility. Denoting the opening cost of this facility by fg∗ = ming∈G fg and any (not
necessarily minimal) routing costs and costs of using vehicles needed to serve all customers
by utilizing only this facility by V RCg∗ , the total cost would be at least as large as C(N),





(fg∗ + V RCg∗) ∀j ∈ N. (20)





(fg∗ + V RCg∗) ≤
|N | − 1
|N |
(fg∗ + V RCg∗) . (21)




|N | − 1
, (22)
(21) then implies ∑
j∈S
πj ≤ fg∗ ∀S ⊂ N. (23)
Since each coalition S ⊂ N needs to locate at least one facility and fg∗ is the minimal cost
associated with this, then ∑
j∈S
πj ≤ C(S) ∀S ⊂ N. (24)
In combination with satisfaction of the efficiency condition, this means that all rationality
conditions (17) are satisfied and (π1, . . . , π|N |) belongs to the core. Hence, the core is non-
empty.
V RCg∗ is not dependent on the value of fg∗ . It is then easy to see that any K such that
V RCg ≤
K
|N | − 1
∀g ∈ G (25)
guarantees a non-empty core and proves the Theorem 10.
This result for the LRG can be generalized to the LRG-L1 and the LRG-L2 as well.
However, in the case of the LRG-C1 or the LRG-C2, due to their capacities, it is not always
feasible to locate only one facility and the same argument cannot be used.
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5 Numerical results
To illustrate the theoretical results and explore the satisfaction of the properties that do
not hold in general, we have conducted a numerical experiment. We also address here the
problem of how to split the savings by applying cost allocation methods frequently used in
the literature.
All presented models and methods are implemented and solved using AMPL/Gurobi
7.5.0.
5.1 Experiment design
We have generated 10,000 instances, all of them containing nine sites of candidate facilities
and three shippers, each of them having two or three customers.
Given a square 100×100, the coordinates x and y of the customers and facility candidates
follow a uniform distribution between 0 and 100. The transportation cost cij between two
nodes is the Euclidean distance between the two nodes. Each shipper is randomly assigned
two or three customers. The demand dj for each customer follows a uniform distribution
between 10 and 100 and the vehicle capacity q follows a uniform distribution between 100 and
200. The fleet is homogeneous. The cost of using a vehicle a is the same for all vehicles and
ranges between 10 and 200 and each facility opening cost fg follows a uniform distribution
between 100 and 300.
In the case of the LRG-L1, the limit on number of facilities l takes value 1, 2 or 3. The
partial limits on number of facilities ln in the LRG-L2 equal either 1 or 2. For the LRG-C1,
the facility capacities wg range from 100 to 500, whereas for the LRG-C2, the partial facility
capacities wgn range from 35 to 200. Generation of the values of wgn in this way implies
that for some coalitions there might be customers whose demand cannot be satisfied from
only one facility. In such case, the LRG-C2 would not yield a feasible solution. We observe
only two instances in which this happens. For further analysis, we exclude those and take
into account only the instances with feasible solutions.
In the non-cooperative case, the facility opening costs range from 12 % to 67 % of the
total costs, the costs of using a vehicle from 3 % to 64 % and the routing costs from 12 % to
65 %. Respective histograms are shown in Figure 3. Overall, the experiment covers a wide
range of how the costs are distributed.
5.2 Game properties
Regarding the properties of subadditivity, convexity and core-emptiness, results of the exper-
iment are shown in Table 2. All instances of the LRG, LRG-C2 and LRG-L2 are subadditive
which confirms the theoretical results from Section 4. There is only a slight change in the
results when it comes to the LRG-C1 and the LRG-L1 in which only 2.7 % and 0.2 % of the
instances respectively end up as non-subadditive. We observe a huge majority of instances
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Figure 3: Histograms of facility opening costs, costs of using vehicles, and routing costs as a
percentage of the total costs incurred in a case of no cooperation taking place
having a non-empty core. Nevertheless, only less than a third of the instances end up being
convex. There are no substantial differences among the models. Only, in the case of the
LRG-C1, satisfaction of the properties is generally slightly lower than in the other models.
Table 2: Satisfaction of properties in location-routing games
subadditive convex non-empty core
LRG 100 % 30.5 % 99.3 %
LRG-C1 97.3 % 22.7 % 92.6 %
LRG-L1 99.8 % 30.3 % 99.1 %
LRG-C2 100 % 26.1 % 99.7 %
LRG-L2 100 % 30.4 % 99.3 %
By definition, in the instances with an empty core, no cost allocation can satisfy the
efficiency condition (16) and the rationality conditions (17) at the same time. By requiring
the efficiency, it can be measured what violation of the rationality constraints is inevitable.
For this, the strong ε-core can be utilized. The strong ε-core, as introduced by Shapley and








πj = C(N), (27)∑
j∈S
πj ≤ C(S) + ε ∀S ⊆ N, (28)
πj ∈ R ∀j ∈ N, (29)
ε ∈ R, (30)
where ε represents the maximal violation of the rationality constraints. For all variants of the
location-routing game, the average maximal violation is rather low and ranges from 0.91 %
to 1.70 % of the respective C(N).
5.3 Impact of the facility costs
As discussed in Section 4.3, for the LRG, LRG-L1, and LRG-L2, the core is non-empty
when the facility costs reach a certain size. We investigate this by generating new sets of
instances with the only change being in the facility cost values. In the new instances we
generate the facility opening costs as multiples of the original facility opening costs, that is,
for a multiplier of 0, all facility opening costs equal zero, for a multiplier of 1, the results
are the same as in Table 2, for a multiplier of 2, all facility opening costs are doubled, and
so on. The results for the LRG are reported in Table 3. We can see that the results confirm
Table 3: Impact of the facility costs on properties of the LRG
facility cost
multiplier
subadditive convex non-empty core
LRG 0 100 % 41.4 % 97.1 %
LRG 1 100 % 30.5 % 99.3 %
LRG 2 100 % 32.0 % 99.9 %
LRG 3 100 % 32.9 % 100 %
LRG 4 100 % 33.5 % 100 %
LRG 5 100 % 33.9 % 100 %
the theoretical findings and the core becomes non-empty already for a multiplier of 3. As
expected, the results are very similar for the case of the LRG-L1 and the LRG-L2. However,
we do not observe similar behavior in the LRG-C1 and the LRG-C2.
5.4 Impact of the vehicle cost
The cost of using a vehicle, a in model (1)–(9), stands for not only the usage of the vehicle as
it might suggest. All kinds of costs regarding the tours, but not dependent on the distance
traveled, should be included. This covers loading and unloading costs, driver-related costs,
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vehicle maintenance costs, and so on. The cost of using a vehicle might hence differ sub-
stantially across applications. Therefore, it is worthwhile to investigate how the properties
of the location-routing games are affected by the magnitude of this cost.
For the LRG, when we compare instances resulting with an empty core with those re-
sulting with a non-empty core, we can see a substantial difference between the average costs
of using a vehicle. This average is 164 for the empty-core instances and 104 for the non-
empty-core instances. We investigate this issue further by generating new sets of instances
in the same way as for the facility costs analysis. Now, the new sets of instances differ only
in the cost of using a vehicle. The results are provided in Table 4. We can notice that
Table 4: Impact of the vehicle cost on properties of the LRG
vehicle cost
multiplier
subadditive convex non-empty core
LRG 0 100 % 28.1 % 100 %
LRG 1 100 % 30.5 % 99.3 %
LRG 2 100 % 30.7 % 97.3 %
LRG 3 100 % 30.8 % 96.4 %
LRG 4 100 % 30.7 % 95.8 %
LRG 5 100 % 30.7 % 95.7 %
the proportion of instances with a non-empty core decreases as the cost of using a vehicle
increases. This indeed supports the observation of different average costs of using a vehicle.
Similar effects can be observed in the case of the LRG-C1, LRG-L1, LRG-C2, and LRG-L2.
5.5 Cost allocations
Regardless of the core emptiness or non-emptiness, in practice, a unique cost allocation often
needs to be specified to assess the contribution of different cooperating parties. With a focus
on collaborative transportation, Guajardo and Rönnqvist (2016) recognized the Shapley
value (Shapley, 1953), the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969) and proportional methods to be
some of the most preferred allocation methods used in literature.
It turns interesting to investigate whether the allocation methods result in allocations
that are rational, that is, satisfy constraints (17). This relates to suitability of different allo-
cation methods for the location-routing game. Besides the Shapley value and the nucleolus,
we investigate the lexicographic equal profit method known as EPML (Frisk et al., 2010;
Dahlberg et al., 2017), and two proportional methods, the first of them proportional to the
stand-alone costs of each shipper and the second one to the total demand of each shipper’s
customers. All these allocation methods by definition satisfy the efficiency condition (16).
Additional satisfaction of the rationality conditions hence means that the respective cost
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allocation belongs to the core. Such an analysis is therefore meaningless for the instances
with an empty core in which all allocations would end up as non-rational. We investigate
how often the particular allocation methods satisfy the rationality conditions in the instances
with a non-empty core. The results are presented in Table 5.










LRG 97.0 % 100 % 100 % 79.7 % 67.7 %
LRG-C1 84.4 % 100 % 100 % 60.5 % 53.1 %
LRG-L1 96.9 % 100 % 100 % 79.3 % 67.4 %
LRG-C2 95.9 % 100 % 100 % 83.7 % 80.3 %
LRG-L2 97.0 % 100 % 100 % 79.7 % 67.7 %
The nucleolus and the EPML excel in the rationality satisfaction, which is not surprising
as they are defined to belong to the core if it is not empty. In a huge majority of the
instances, the rationality is also satisfied by the Shapley value. The proportional methods do
not perform that well. Nevertheless, in the computation of the Shapley value, the nucleolus,
and the EPML, the cost associated with each possible coalition needs to be determined.
This becomes an obstacle when the number of shippers increases as the number of coalitions
grows exponentially. The proportional methods, on the other hand, do not face this problem
and might therefore be a preferred option. In case of seeking a proportional method, from
Table 5 we can suggest the allocation proportional to the stand-alone costs to be the one
to choose. In fact, we observe that the cost proportional method performs better in all the
location-routing game variants.
As already mentioned, in the instances with an empty core, no allocation method can
satisfy all the rationality conditions. To propose a similar allocation quality measure, a
modification of the strong ε-core model (26)–(30) becomes useful. If, for a given allocation







πj ≤ C(S) + ε ∀S ⊆ N, (32)
ε ∈ R, (33)
the optimal solution of ε represents the maximal violation of the rationality constraints
(17). Table 6 shows the average maximal violation as a percentage of the respective C(N)
for various cost allocation methods (the EPML is not included because it is defined only
for games with a non-empty core). The results support the previous findings with the
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Table 6: Average maximal violation of rationality constraints by various cost allocation










LRG 2.5 % 1.1 % 5.3 % 7.3 %
LRG-C1 3.5 % 1.7 % 5.5 % 7.7 %
LRG-L1 2.7 % 1.2 % 5.6 % 7.3 %
LRG-C2 3.2 % 0.9 % 5.3 % 7.3 %
LRG-L2 2.5 % 1.1 % 5.3 % 7.3 %
nucleolus having the lowest average maximal violation of the rationality constraints. This,
ranging from 0.9 % to 1.7 %, outperforms the Shapley value, the cost proportional method,
and the demand proportional method in all the location-routing game variants. Among the
proportional methods, the cost proportional method again performs better in all the variants.
5.6 Savings
From the results of the LRG, it can be seen that the savings of the shippers can be substantial,
as shown in Figure 4. The histogram shows percentage savings when the grand coalition is
10 % 20 % 30 % 40 % 50 % 60 % 70 % 80 % 90 % 100 %
500
1,000
Figure 4: Histogram of percentage savings of the grand coalition with respect to the sum of
the stand-alone costs
formed as opposed to a non-cooperative case represented as a sum of the stand-alone costs.
These cost savings range from 6 % to 62 % with an average of 32 %. The main source of the
savings is that less facilities are often needed when the grand coalition forms. The facility
opening costs are on average reduced by 63 %.
Although it might seem counter-intuitive, we observe 14 % of instances where the total
routing cost increases in comparison to the non-cooperative solution as seen in Figure 5.
The intuition for this is that, since collaboration aims at reducing the overall costs (which
include routing costs, facility opening costs and costs of using vehicles), it is possible that
in some situations the selection of a reduced number of facilities might offset the increase in
costs due to larger distance traveled. On average, however, the routing costs are reduced by
19
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Figure 5: Histogram of percentage difference of the grand coalition’s routing cost with respect
to the sum of the stand-alone routing costs
The transportation is commonly recognized as one of the main contributors of CO2
emissions (Ballot and Fontane, 2010). The increase in the traveled distance might thus lead
to negative environmental effects. As this is accompanied by a change in facility selection,
it is difficult to draw general conclusions. However, shippers pursuing collaboration should
be aware of this possible side effect.
6 Concluding remarks
Horizontal cooperation is receiving more and more attention across transportation and lo-
gistics processes. The location-routing problem is no exception with companies cooperating
on both locating their facilities and serving their customers. While there exists evidence of
successful cooperation in practice (Eyers, 2010; Paddeu, 2017), the literature lacks general
assessment of benefits coming from horizontal cooperation in location-routing problems.
In this article, we have introduced the standard location-routing game, a collaborative
formulation of the standard location-routing problem. For both the capacitated location-
routing problem and the location-routing problem with limited number of facilities, we have
defined two alternative formulations of their collaborative versions. In three of these prob-
lems, we have shown the subadditivity property to hold in general. However, in the other
two, the subadditivity is not always satisfied. Moreover, none of the problems guarantees
the convexity or a non-empty core. Nevertheless, for the standard location-routing game
and the location-routing game with limited number of facilities, we have shown that, when
the facility opening costs are substantially larger than the traveling costs and the costs of
using vehicles, the core is guaranteed to be non-empty.
Although it is not possible to guarantee core allocations in general, with a numerical
experiment, we have shown that the core allocations exist in a huge majority of our instances.
The results have also supported the findings of the effect of facility opening costs on the core
emptiness. As the facility opening costs increase, the likelihood of a non-empty core increases.
On the other hand, with the costs of using vehicles, we have observed the opposite effect. As
the vehicle costs increase, the likelihood of a non-empty core decreases. It is important to
note that the core emptiness does not necessarily outrule the cooperation. Often, regardless
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of the emptiness or non-emptiness of the core, it is preferred to pursue the cooperation and
choose a unique cost allocation. We have tested the performance of various cost allocation
methods. With respect to the stability, the results have shown dominance of the nucleolus
and the lexicographical equal profit method. The latter is however not defined for the cases
with an empty core and cannot thus be used under any circumstances. The Shapley value
has shown a fairly good performance as well, followed by the cost proportional method and
the demand proportional method.
The focus of this article was on exploration of the properties of location-routing games.
While the numerical experiment was conducted in small instances that can be solved to
optimality, an interesting avenue for future research is to explore location-routing games
where the approximate solutions, instead of the optimal ones, are taken into account. In
fact, large-scale instances often occurring in practice are commonly solved with heuristic
approaches (Schneider and Drexl, 2017). It is worthwhile to investigate whether different
solution approaches preserve the same properties.
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